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THE STANDING OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
Amitai Etzioni* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Liberal communitarianism holds that a good society is based on a carefully 
crafted balance between individual rights and the common good; that both 
normative elements have the same fundamental standing and neither a priori 
trumps the other.1 Societies can lose the good balance either by becoming 
excessively committed to the common good (e.g., national security) or to 
individual rights (e.g., privacy). Even societies that have established a careful 
balance often need to recalibrate it following changes in historical conditions (such 
as the 2001 attacks on the American homeland) and technological developments 
(such as the invention of smart cell phones).  
This article responds to those who reject the very concept of a common good 
(or the public interest) on a variety of philosophical and methodological grounds. It 
then asks: (1) how the American courts, in particular the Supreme Court of the 
United States, define the common good; (2) what weight the courts have granted 
the common good versus individual rights; and (3) what criteria they have 
employed in rendering these judgments in three key areas: free speech, public 
safety, and a major form of taking, eminent domain. 
To cover these vast subjects, this article by necessity employs very broad 
strokes. Readers may allow the author to indulge in these kind of strokes if they 
keep in mind that this article seeks to make merely a few limited points, though 
making them requires covering a great deal of ground. What is considered a 
common good and the relative normative standing it commands has varied over 
history.2 These historical changes require a separate treatment, from society to 
 ________________________  
 * I am indebted to Rory Donnelly for research assistance and to Professors Scott Cummings and Sudha 
Setty for comments on a previous draft. 
 1. BEAU BRESLIN, THE COMMUNITARIAN CONSTITUTION 206 (2004); Amitai Etzioni, A Liberal 
Communitarian Approach to Security Limitations on the Freedom of the Press, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
1141, 1146–47 (2014). 
 2. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, POLITICS: BOOK I ¶¶ 1–12 (Benjamin Jowett trans.) (c. 350 B.C.E.) (“Every state 
is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good; . . . the state comes 
into existence . . . for the sake of a good life.”), available at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html; 
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, THE REPUBLIC OF CICERO 56 (G. & C. Carvill 1829) (c. 51 B.C.E.) (“Every 
assemblage of men however, gathered together without an object, is not the people, but only an assemblage of the 
multitude associated by common consent, for reciprocal rights and reciprocal usefulness.”), available at 
https://archive.org/stream/republicofcicero00cicerich#page/56/mode/2up; PHILIP SCHAFF, ST. AUGUSTIN’S CITY 
OF GOD AND CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE 597 (1890) (“where there is not this righteousness whereby . . . man loves God 
as He ought to be loved, and his neighbor as himself—there, I say, there is not an assemblage associated . . . by a 
community of interests.”), available at http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/1819-
1893,_Schaff._Philip,_2_Vol_02_The_City_Of_God._Christian_Doctrine,_EN.pdf; ROBERT BELLAH ET AL., 
HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 333 (2008) (discussing the 
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society in the same time frame. The discussion here focuses on the modern era in 
the United States. 
II.  WHAT IS A COMMON GOOD? 
The common good (also referred to as the “public interest” or “public goods”) 
is the sum of “those goods that serve all members of a given community and its 
institutions,” including “goods that serve no identifiable particular group, as well as 
those that serve members of generations not yet born.”3 
For many economists, the common good is the aggregation of individual 
goods.4  It grows out of economic exchanges, and hence there is no need for the 
state to promote the common good.5 The “term ‘the common good’ is contested on 
a number of fronts. First, there are those who argue that it does not exist at all.”6 
Ayn Rand wrote that, “Since there is no such entity as ‘the public,’ since the public 
is merely a number of individuals, the idea that ‘the public interest’ supersedes 
private interests and rights, can have but one meaning: that the interests and rights 
of some individuals take precedence over the interests and rights of others.”7 
In contrast, communitarians hold that the common good encompasses much 
more than the sum of all individual goods.8 Moreover, “[c]ontributions to the 
common good often offer no immediate payout or benefit” to anyone, and it is 
frequently difficult to foresee who will be the beneficiaries in the longer run.9 
Moreover, members of communities invest in the common good not because their 
investment will necessarily benefit them “but because they consider it a good that 
ought to be” promoted and served.10 The nature of these commitments is revealed 
  
direction of the common good in the United States); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS VI.II.46 
(1790) (“The wise and virtuous man is at all times willing that his own private interest should be sacrificed to the 
public interest of his own particular order or society.”), available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS6.html.  
 3. Amitai Etzioni, Common Good, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 603, 603 (Michael T. 
Gibbons ed., 2015), available at 
http://icps.gwu.edu/sites/icps.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Common%20Good.Etzioni.pdf. 
 4. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Summers, Morning Prayers Address at Appleton Chapel, Memorial Church, 
Cambridge, MA (Sept. 15, 2003) (“It is the basis of much economic analysis that the good is an aggregation of 
many individuals’ assessments of their own well-being.”), available at 
http://www.harvard.edu/president/speeches/summers_2003/prayer.php. 
 5. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 95 (Psychology Press, 2001) (1944). 
 6. Etzioni, supra note 3, at 607.  
 7. Ayn Rand, The Pull Peddlers, in CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 167, 170 (1967); see also 
Interview by Douglas Keay with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, in London, Eng. 
(Sept. 23, 1987) available at http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689 (“There are individual men and 
women and there are families and no government can do anything except through people and people look to 
themselves first. . . . There is no such thing as society.”). 
 8. Amitai Etzioni, Communitarianism, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1366457/communitarianism/299522/A-synthesis-Rights-and-
responsibilities (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).  
 9. Etzioni, supra note 3, at 607. 
 10. Id.; see also PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF 
COMMUNITY 385 (1994). 
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“when serving the common good entails . . . costs to the individual (e.g., taxes)” 
and above all risks “such as fighting for one’s country.”11 
Economists do recognize that there are situations in which the market fails to 
provide “public goods” that benefit society at large, making government promotion 
of these goods legitimate.12 Such “public goods include defense, basic research, 
and public health (e.g., fluoridation and vaccinations).”13 
Political scientists who adopt the assumptions of economics see little need for 
the concept of the public interest.14 These political scientists hold that in a liberal 
democracy, “competition among interest groups—which reveal and are guided by 
the preferences of individuals (i.e., private goods)—gives rise to a public policy 
that maximizes general welfare.”15  
Critics of that view argue that discrepancies in wealth, power, and social status 
grant various groups varying measures of leverage over the government.16 As a 
result, public policy—based on interest group politics—does not serve the common 
good, but rather the interests of the powerful groups.17   
A criticism of the common good from the left holds that the “concept . . . 
serves to conceal class differences in economic interests and political power so as 
to keep those who are disadvantaged from making demands on the community.”18 
However, the fact that a concept is abused does not mean that it is without much 
merit.  
Finally, several academic communitarians, in particular Michael Sandel and 
Charles Taylor, showed that conceptions of the common good “must be formulated 
on the social level, and that the community cannot be” neutral in this matter.19 
Moreover, in the author’s view, “[u]nless there is a social formulation of the good, 
there can be no normative foundation for resolving conflicts of value among 
individuals and groups.”20  
To state that a given value is a common good of a given community does not 
mean that all the members subscribe to it, and surely not that they all live up to its 
dictates.21 It suffices that the value is recognized as a common good by large 
majorities and is embodied in law and in other institutions.22 At the same time, a 
 ________________________  
 11. Etzioni, supra note 3, at 607. 
 12. Erik Bækkeskov, Market Failure, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1937869/market-failure (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
 13. Etzioni, supra note 3, at 604; see also Dinesh Sharma, A Vaccine Nation, 28 HEALTH AFF. 590, 590 
(2009) (reviewing JACOB HELLER, THE VACCINE NARRATIVE (2008)); see also Bækkeskov, supra note 12. 
 14. This view is advocated particularly by the public choice school of political economy. See, e.g., William 
F. Shughart II, Public Choice, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 427 (2nd ed. 2008), available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicChoice.html. 
 15. Etzioni, supra note 3, at 606; see also Clive S. Thomas, Interest Group, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/290136/interest-group (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
 16. Etzioni, supra note 3, at 606. 
 17. Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and 
Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 576 (2014). 
 18. Etzioni, supra note 3, at 608. 
 19. Id.; see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO 260 (2009); see also 
CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 190–91 (1995). 
 20. Etzioni, supra note 3, at 608. 
 21. See Amitai Etzioni, The Good Society, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 83, 89–90 (2003). 
 22. Id. 
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value to which members merely pay lip service cannot qualify. This article will 
clarify below that it is essential for solid analysis to consider the extent to which 
values are institutionalized as a continuous variable rather than as a dichotomous 
one. Some values are relatively highly institutionalized (e.g., marriages in the 
United States in the 1950s). Others are merely aspirational (e.g., the belief that the 
United States should promote democratic regimes overseas). The common good 
may be promoted and enforced by the state, but this is not necessarily the case.23 
Indeed, often core values are promoted by informal social controls, by peer 
pressures, and by communities.24 
Particularly important and challenging is the observation that references to the 
common good should be read as if the emphasis is on the “common” and not on the 
“good.”  For the following discussion, the main issue is whether a value is widely 
shared and institutionalized—not whether a particular ethicist would judge it to be 
morally good. Thus, for example, a society may define a common good as giving 
precedence to economic development over political development—or expect that 
all members adhere to a particular religion. Many may not consider it a good 
society, but it is the “good” the given society has formulated as its common good.  
Several scholars made strong arguments against the kind of balancing approach 
here followed.25 They argue that rights are a common good, and hence, the very 
opposition of the two goods—rights and the common good—that the balancing 
analysis presupposes is a false one.26 This view is held particularly with regard to 
freedom of speech, taking inspiration from Justice Holmes’ dissent in Abrams v. 
United States27 that the “ultimate good,” both for the individual and society, is 
“better reached by free trade in ideas.”28 It is expressed in the Federal 
Communications Commission’s opinion that “the public interest is best served by 
permitting free expression of views.”29 Likewise, Scott Cummings points out that 
many believe that “strong protection for individual rights is itself advancing the 
public interest.”30   
At first, it may seem that one can resolve this issue by granting that common 
goods are a right. For instance, instead of referring to security as a common good, 
one can recognize a right to be safe, or a right to life.31 However, such redefinition 
does not vacate or obviate the balancing question. It merely moves it from asking 
about the balance between a good and a right to the balance between adhering to 
two rights that command different pubic policies and behaviors. One can speak 
 ________________________  
 23. See Etzioni, supra note 3, at 605–06.  
 24. Id. at 608–09. 
 25. See Kevin P. Quinn, Sandel’s Communitarianism and Public Deliberations over Health Care Policy, 
85 GEO. L.J. 2161, 2182–83 (1997). 
 26. See Jack B. Sarno, A Natural Law Defense of Buckley V. Valeo, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2693, 2737 
(1998). 
 27. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919).  
 28. Id. at 630. 
 29. The FCC and Freedom of Speech, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/guides/fcc-and-freedom-speech (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
 30. Interview with Scott L. Cummings, Robert Henigson Professor of Legal Ethics, UCLA School of Law 
(Dec. 9, 2014). 
 31. AMITAI ETZIONI, SECURITY FIRST 5–7 (2007). 
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about the difference between what the right to privacy and the right to safety call 
for, but this change in wording leaves standing the questions of which right the 
nation is tilting toward in a given period, and where it ought to tilt.  
One next notes that many common goods are not recognized as rights either in 
the United States Constitution or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.32 
There is no right to national parks, historical preservation, public health, or basic 
research.33 One can of course aspire to add these rights; but until they are 
recognized as such, it is best not to dismiss the normative claims for these goods 
because they are “merely” common goods and not individual rights. 
Last but not least, some common goods cannot be reasonably defined as 
individual rights.34 The National Archive in Washington, D.C. houses the original 
copy of the Constitution.35 There is a clear common good.36 However, to argue that 
individual Americans have a right to have the Constitution preserved is stretching 
the concept of right to the point it becomes meaningless and has no foundation, 
neither in American core normative concepts nor legal traditions.    
The following application of the liberal communitarian balancing approach to 
the analysis of the balancing of individual rights and the common good in three 
major areas of law—free speech, public safety, and eminent domain—provides an 
opportunity to test the suggestion that this mode of analysis is quite productive.  
III.  FREE SPEECH: SURPRISING HOMAGE TO THE COMMON GOOD 
There is a rather wide consensus that the Supreme Court of the United States 
has tilted heavily in favor of the right to free speech and has shown little concern 
for the common good (other than the common good free speech itself engenders) 
when serving it entails curbing free speech.37 The United States’ legal and 
normative commitment to free speech is considered one of the strongest in the 
world.38 The text of the First Amendment, which enshrines this right, reads 
unequivocally that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”39 The United States tolerates hate speech that several other 
democracies have banned, such as Holocaust denial, racist speech, and fascist 
speech; and the Supreme Court has generally overturned laws that ban speech 
 ________________________  
 32. See George Anastaplo, The Constitution at Two Hundred: Explorations, 22 TEX. TECH L. REV. 967, 
1095–96 (1991). See generally The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS,  
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2015) (not recognizing all common goods as rights). 
 33. See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 32.  
 34. See generally Sarno, supra note 26, at 2737 (noting that individual rights are part of the common good). 
 35. See The National Archives: Temple of Founding History, CONSTITIONALFACTS.COM, 
http://www.constitutionfacts.com/founders-library/national-archives/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
 36. See Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalism Precedent, and the 
Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419, 437, 441 (2006). 
 37. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Bohn, Put on Your Coat, A Chill Wind Blows: Embracing the Expansion of the 
Adverse Employment Action Factor in the Tenth Circuit First Amendment Retaliation Claims, 83 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 867, 887 (2006). 
 38. See Margot Kaminski, Copyright Crime and Punishment: The First Amendment’s Proportionality 
Problem, 73 MD. L. REV. 587, 587 (2014).  
 39. U.S. CONST. amend I (emphasis added). 
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based on its hateful or otherwise distasteful content.40 The Supreme Court has also 
set an extremely high bar on restricting speech based on its advocacy of violence or 
illegality; such speech must be likely to cause “imminent lawless action” to lose 
First Amendment protection.41 Almost no speech clears this bar in the Court’s 
view.42 
True, this strong interpretation of the First Amendment was gained only in the 
1920s, following the founding of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and 
the influential dissents of Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis D. Brandeis 
in Abrams v. United States43 that eventually convinced the Court majority to adopt 
stricter standards for legal restrictions on speech.44 Previously, the Court had been 
much more communitarian in this matter.45 This is evident in cases such as Rosen 
v. United States,46 Schenck v. United States,47 and Abrams v. United States,48 all of 
which permitted significant content-based restrictions on speech.49 However, 
beginning in the 1920s, the Court became a very strong defender of the right to free 
speech.50 And this right was extended in Brandenburg v. Ohio to permit “advocacy 
of the use of force or of law violation” unless it is likely to incite “imminent 
lawless action,”51 and extended further in Hess v. Indiana, to permit speech with a 
“tendency to lead to violence” unless “intended to produce, and likely to produce, 
imminent disorder.”52 Other right-broadening rulings include the holdings in 
National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie;53 Texas v. Johnson;54 
Snyder v. Phelps; 55 and McCullen v. Coakley.56  
At first blush, one may argue that the 1973 ruling about obscenity in Miller v. 
California laid out clear content-based guidelines about impermissible speech, and 
hence showed that the Court in this area was willing to accord great weight to what 
it perceived as a common good.57 However, in practice, obscenity laws are “rarely 
 ________________________  
 40. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 434–35 (1992); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 
443, 459–60 (2011); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481–82 (2010). 
 41. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969). 
 42. See, e.g., id. 
 43. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624, 631 (1919). 
 44. See, e.g., Freedom of Expression, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/free-speech/freedom-expression (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
 45. See, e.g., Rosen v. United States 161 U.S. 29, 43 (1896).  
 46. Id. (upholding a conviction for mailing “obscene” material). 
 47. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52–53 (1919) (upholding a conviction for criticizing the draft).  
 48. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624 (upholding a conviction for criticizing war production).  
 49. See Erin D. Guyton, Tweeting “Fire” in a Crowded Theater: Distinguishing Between Advocacy and 
Incitement in the Social Media World, 82 MISS. L.J. 689, 695, 698–99 (2013). 
 50. See ACLU, supra note 44. 
 51. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 52. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973). 
 53. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977) (requiring “strict procedural 
safeguards” for a state to obstruct a neo-Nazi march in a neighborhood of Holocaust survivors).  
 54. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (allowing flag burning).  
 55. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 449–50 (2011) (ruling speech on a public issue in a public place is 
not liable to a tort of emotional distress, even if “outrageous” in content and context). 
 56. See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2549 (2014) (invalidating a “buffer zone” against protests 
near an abortion clinic). 
 57. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36–37 (1973). 
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enforced and widely ignored,”58 not least due to the vagueness of parts of the 
Miller test.59 Similarly, having determined in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire that 
“fighting words” that provoke violent retaliation are not protected by the First 
Amendment,60 the Court proceeded to weaken that ruling in subsequent decisions 
and has not found any speech to qualify as fighting words in the cases that 
followed.61  
As for the incitement or advocacy of violence, while the Court upheld in 
Whitney v. California the prohibition of speech threatening to “incite to crime, 
disturb the public peace, or threaten [the] overthrow [of government] by unlawful 
means,” 62 it overturned that standard in Brandenburg v. Ohio,63 interpreting the 
“clear and present danger” standard for unprotected speech of Schenck v. United 
States64 as limited to that likely and intended to produce “imminent lawless 
action.”65 As the concurrence acknowledged, such a standard only applies in very 
“rare instances.”66 The bar for finding that speech constitutes such incitement has 
been set so high that the prosecution finds it next to impossible to clear, and thus 
serves as a powerful speech protection, particularly given that the Court upheld this 
protection in subsequent cases.67 One notable exception has been in terrorism 
cases, where the Brandenburg test has been bypassed or applied by lower courts on 
shaky grounds,68 and where the Supreme Court has held that material support for 
terrorist organizations through forms of speech (such as legal services and advice) 
is not protected by the First Amendment.69 
At first it may seem that the Court’s upholding of laws against child 
pornography is a major exception to its very strong protection of free speech. 
However, it is important to note that even in the case of such a popularly detested 
form of speech,70 the Court justified its restrictions on child pornography not with 
reference to the harm associated with viewing or distributing child pornography to 
the moral fabric of society or to the debasement of the culture, but rather to the 
specific harm inflicted on children as actors who play a role in its production.71 
 ________________________  
 58. Michael J. Gray, Applying Nuisance Law to Internet Obscenity, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 
317, 317 (2010). 
 59. See id. at 352. 
 60. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire , 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942). 
 61. See, e.g., Terminiello v. City of Chi., 337 U.S. 1, 6 (1949); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 
(1971); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972); see also David L. Hudson Jr., Fighting Words, FIRST 
AMENDMENT CTR., (Mar. 7, 2015), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/fighting-words. 
 62. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927). 
 63. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969). 
 64. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 65. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449. 
 66. Id. at 457. 
 67. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973); Communist Party of Ind. v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 
441, 450 (1974); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 933–34 (1982); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397, 435 (1989). 
 68. See, e.g., United States v. Rahman 189 F.3d 88, 115; Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 730–731 (2009). 
 69. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 41, 59 (2010). 
 70. See, e.g., Daniel P. Mears et al, Sex Crimes, Children, and Pornography, 54 CRIME & DELINQ. 532, 
533 (2008). 
 71. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 235–36 (2002).  
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Thus, in New York v. Ferber, the Court upheld a statute banning child pornography 
on the basis that the “prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children 
constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance.”72 Likewise,in 
Osborne v. Ohio, the Court upheld a ban on the mere possession of child 
pornography on the basis of “compelling interests in protecting the physical and 
psychological well-being of minors.”73 
Moreover, the Court explicitly denied in Osborne any “paternalistic interest in 
regulating [the] mind” for fear “that obscenity would poison the minds of its 
viewers,”74 and it made clear in Ferber that its ruling was limited to “live 
performances and photographic reproductions,” not all child pornography per se.75 
This distinction was affirmed in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition when the Court 
held that a ban on virtual child pornography (that is, pornography not involving 
real children) was “overbroad and unconstitutional” as it “also prohibit[ed] speech 
having serious redeeming value.”76 In short, the Court’s rulings have sought to 
limit child pornography as employment, not as a speech issue.77 Even here, the 
Court refused to limit speech to defend a common good, however good it may 
seem to many people.78 
This article will not deal with the Court’s rulings on libel and defamation, as 
these forms of speech are disputed mainly on the basis of harm to individuals rather 
than to the common good. It also does not cover the Court’s treatment of money 
used in election campaigns as speech because the rulings involved raise such a 
great number of other issues that they command a separate treatment. 
Given the Court’s very strong defense of free speech in the contentious areas of 
obscenity, provocation, and incitement not found in other democracies,79 one might 
conclude that the Court has little regard for public interests in this area and takes an 
absolutist approach to free speech rights. Indeed, this is a position often articulated 
both in public discourse and in academia.80 Some find that the “absolutist free 
speech model in the United States” is “foundationally very different and much 
more protective of liberty . . . than those of Europe or Canada,”81 while others 
bemoan the “‘absolutist’ position” and “ideological refusal to acknowledge [the] 
dangerous implications for the growth of hate speech.”82 However, we find that the 
Court has taken a surprisingly communitarian position in one area—in greatly 
limiting the time, place, and manner (TPM) of speech, in order to serve a variety of 
 ________________________  
 72. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982). 
 73. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 103 (1990). 
 74. Id. at 109. 
 75. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762. 
 76. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 235 (2002). 
 77. See, e.g., id. at 235–36, 271. 
 78. See id. at 272.  
 79. James M. Boland, Is Free Speech Compatible with Human Dignity, Equality, and Democratic 
Government: America, a Free Speech Island in a Sea of Censorship?, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 1, 17 (2013). 
 80. Id. at 18. 
 81. Id. at 23.  
 82. John D.H. Downing, ‘Hate Speech’ and `First Amendment Absolutism’ Discourses in the US, 10 
DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 175, 175 (1999), available at http://www.sagepub.com/lippmanstudy/articles/Downing.pdf. 
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communitarian interests that do not command nearly as much normative standing 
as avoiding violence, inter- group hatred, or degrading the moral culture.83 
For example, the Court upheld Los Angeles’ ban on posting fliers on public 
property, given the City’s interests in “preventing visual clutter, minimizing traffic 
hazards, and preventing interference with the intended use of public property.”84 It 
upheld permit requirements that limit marches on public streets in order to protect 
“public convenience”85 rather than speech. Other relevant cases concern those in 
which the Court upheld a ban on sound trucks that emit “loud and raucous noises,” 
given the “need for reasonable protection in the homes or business houses from the 
distracting noises,”86 as well as a ban on noisy protests on school grounds on the 
basis of the “compelling interest in having an undisrupted school session.”87 And 
the Court upheld a statute forcing performers to use government-provided sound 
equipment and technicians to ensure that performances in a certain venue were not 
too loud.88  
Many other TPM rulings limit speech to provide noise controls.89 For example, 
the Court upheld a ban on picketing outside residential homes in order to protect 
the “wellbeing, tranquility, and privacy of the home,” an “important aspect” of 
protecting “unwilling listeners” from the intrusion of objectionable or unwanted 
speech.90 That is, of course, the kind of speech that supporters of the First 
Amendment hold to be most worth protecting.91  
The Court has been willing, consistently, to limit speech for common goods 
that may be justified but command less of a standing in society’s scale of values as 
compared to those it left almost completely unprotected.92 One may argue that the 
Court found it much easier to limit speech causes served by TPM limitations on 
speech because these restrictions are content-neutral, while to serve other causes 
might well entail limiting speeches of one kind of content (e.g., radical) and not 
others (e.g., moderate). However, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, France, 
Germany, and Australia are among the nations that were able to set such content-
based limits; and still free speech thrives in these countries, and they are considered 
 ________________________  
 83. Leon E. Trakman, Transforming Free Speech: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 899, 918–
19 (1995).  
 84. Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 789 (1984). 
 85. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941). 
 86. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 78, 89 (1949). 
 87. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 119 (1972). 
 88. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989). 
 89. State v. Adams, No. 02CA171, 2004 WL 1380494, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. June 14, 2004) (“The desire to 
reduce and control noise has repeatedly been held to be a content-neutral justification for laws that regulate the 
time, place, or manner of protected speech.”). 
 90. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988). 
 91. Osama Siddique & Zahra Hayat, Unholy Speech and Holy Laws: Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan-
Controversial Origins, Design Defects, and Free Speech Implications, 17 MINN. J. INTL. L. 303, 364–65 (2008). 
 92. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (ruling flag burning is constitutional); Snyder v. 
Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 459 (2011) (ruling that protesting during a fallen soldier’s funeral is constitutionally 
protected); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (ruling law prohibiting hate speech 
unconstitutional); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (ruling a noise ordinance 
constitutionally valid); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting the use of 
sound amplifying devices making loud and raucous noises on the city streets). 
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solid democracies.93 Moreover, American society has erected strong taboos against 
select terms and symbols such as the “N-word,” which has led to the firing of news 
anchors and the benching of sports stars who used it,94 illustrating that one can 
draw a content line without sliding down a slippery slope of censorship or 
otherwise suppressing free speech. 
In short, it seems quite clear that the Court is willing to allow the most 
profound sensibilities of the majority of Americans to be offended (e.g., by flag 
burning), let their emotions and values be assaulted (e.g., when they bury their 
fallen soldiers), tolerate speech that promotes hate in the most vile terms, and even 
allow speech that may well incite violence or riots—but ban speech that may 
disrupt the slumber of some suburbanites or upset the tranquility of the downtown 
business community.95 Instead of being particularly un-communitarian when it 
comes to free speech by greatly privileging this right, the Court has repeatedly 
shown itself to be willing to curb speech for relatively light common goods and not 
for the weightiest ones.96 
IV.  PUBLIC SAFETY: UNCLEAR BUT PRESENT BALANCE 
A review of Supreme Court rulings shows that the Court has a broad 
understanding of public safety that allows diverse intrusions into the realm of 
individual rights to serve this common good.97 The most basic element of public 
safety is upholding law and order, the deterrence and prevention of crime.98 A 
second element of public safety relates to preventing accidental death and injury.99 
Thus, the Court allowed suspicionless, random drug and alcohol testing of train 
engineers in the wake of a series of train accidents,100 as well as random sobriety 
 ________________________  
 93. Jeannine Bell, Restraining the Heartless: Racist Speech and Minority Rights, 84 IND. L.J. 963, 976 
(2009). 
 94. See Sam Wood, Suit over Fired Fox Anchor’s Use of ‘N-word’ Gets Green Light, PHILLY.COM, (Feb. 
10, 2015, 1:57 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/Suit_over_fired_Fox_anchors_use_of_N-
word_gets_green_light_.html; Liverpool’s Suarez Fined, Suspended over Racist Remarks, CNN, (Dec. 21, 2011), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/12/20/sport/football/suarez-racism/.  
 95. See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399; Phelps, 562 U.S. at 459–60; R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381; Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. at 790; Cooper, 336 U.S. at 87. 
 96. See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399; Phelps, 562 U.S. at 459–60; R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381; Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. at 790; Cooper, 336 U.S. at 87.  
 97. See infra pp 17–27. 
 98. While there is no universal definition of public safety, it is a term most often associated with law 
enforcement, typically with fire and emergency medical services, and less consistently with public health and 
infrastructure. See, e.g., Public Safety Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM, 
http://definitions.uslegal.com/p/public-safety/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2015) (“Public Safety refers to the welfare and 
protection of the general public. . . . The primary goal . . . is prevention and protection of the public from dangers 
affecting safety such as crimes or disasters. In many cases the public safety division will be comprised of 
individuals from other organizations including police, emergency medical services, fire force etc.”); Jonas Prager, 
Contract City Redux: Weston, Florida, as the Ultimate New Public Management Model City, 68 PUB. ADMIN. 
REV. 167, 167–80 (2008); Donny Jackson, Public-Safety Groups Disagree on ‘Public-Safety Entity’ Definition, 
Including Utility Usage of FirstNet, IWCE’S URGENT COMM., (Nov. 6, 2014), 
http://urgentcomm.com/ntiafirstnet/public-safety-groups-disagree-public-safety-entity-definition-including-utility-
usage-f; VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-801 (2015) (defining a public safety officer). 
 99. See supra text accompanying note 98.  
 100. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989). 
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checkpoints on highways to prevent deadly car accidents resulting from drunk 
driving.101 A third element of public safety is the promotion of public health.102 
Thus, the Court held that the public interest in eradicating the smallpox disease 
justified compulsory vaccination programs,103 despite the resulting intrusion on 
privacy, and held that search warrants for Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSHA) inspections do not require “probable cause in the criminal law sense.”104  
Another element of public safety is the promotion of national security and 
counterterrorism.105 This element is not encompassed in this examination because 
of great differences between this public good and the others under study.  
In seeking to determine where to draw the communitarian balance in this area, 
the Court very often draws on the Fourth Amendment.106 This Amendment 
captures the basic thesis of the liberal communitarian way of thinking well. By 
banning only unreasonable searches and seizures,107 the Fourth Amendment 
recognizes, on the face of it, a category of reasonable searches, which turn out 
typically to be those that promote public safety and do not require a warrant or 
probable cause. That is, the very text speaks of two sides, and hence, of a balance 
in sharp contrast to the First Amendment, which states “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”108  
Finally, disregarding those who oppose the very notion of balancing,109 the 
Court determines whether searches are reasonable through “the balancing of 
competing interests,” which the Court views as the “key principle of the Fourth 
Amendment.”110 Thus, the Court weighs the “nature and quality of the intrusion on 
the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the 
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion”111 to determine whether “the 
totality of the circumstances justified a particular sort of search or seizure.”112 The 
Fourth Amendment is thus a liberal communitarian text par excellence. 
In seeking the point of balance between individual rights and public safety, the 
Court has used a variety of criteria, each with its own rationale.113 The result is a 
 ________________________  
 101. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990). 
 102. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 11 (1905) (arguing that overturning mandatory vaccination 
would “would practically strip the legislative department of its function to care for the public health and the public 
safety when endangered by epidemics of disease”). 
 103. Id. at 38. 
 104. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978). 
 105. See, e.g., Terrorism, INTERPOL, http://www.interpol.int/en/Crime-areas/Terrorism/Terrorism (last 
visited Sept. 2, 2015) (“terrorist incidents carried out with chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and 
explosives materials . . . would constitute a major threat to public safety and security, both nationally and 
internationally.”). 
 106. See infra pp 17–27. 
 107. U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
 108. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
 109. See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he scale analogy is not really appropriate, since the interests on both sides are incommensurate. It 
is more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”). 
 110. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981). 
 111. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983). 
 112. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985). 
 113. See, e.g., Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 34 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 37, 37 (2005) 
(listing criteria that the Court uses to rationalize warrantless searches and seizures). 
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complex, difficult, and at times wavering or inconsistent approach. Thus, the Court 
adopted in 1948 the “cardinal rule that, in seizing goods and articles, law 
enforcement agents must secure and use search warrants wherever reasonably 
practicable,”114 only to assert two years later (following the appointment of new 
justices) that the “relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search 
warrant, but whether the search was reasonable” based on “the facts and 
circumstances” of each case.115 The following review of several of the Court’s key 
positions on public safety reveals that in a considerable number of cases, the Court 
places a high value on public safety when balanced against individual rights.116 The 
review strictly aims to support a conclusion rather than attempt to provide a 
comprehensive review of all or even most relevant cases. 
A. Exigent Circumstances 
One criterion used by the Court to balance public safety and individual rights is 
the presence of “exigent circumstances” that make a warrantless search or seizure 
“imperative;” for instance, when an emergency creates an urgent need for police to 
act.117 The Court has held such emergencies to include the pursuit of a fleeing 
suspect, the imminent destruction of evidence, and the “need to protect or preserve 
life or avoid serious injury.”118 
Two cases illustrate this criterion.119 In Warden v. Hayden, the Court upheld 
the warrantless entry of police into a private house to pursue a fleeing armed 
robbery suspect on the ground that to “require police officers to delay in the course 
of an investigation” might “gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.” 120 
Having concluded the search was reasonable, the Court also rejected the broader 
principle that police may only search a home for, and seize, evidence in which the 
State has some property interest (such as stolen goods), holding instead that 
searches for “mere evidence” of a crime does not violate constitutional protections 
against self-incrimination.121 Thus, the Court qualified both the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments in order to promote public safety.  
In Kentucky v. King, the Court upheld the warrantless entry of police into an 
apartment after officers smelled marijuana, knocked on the door, and heard what 
they suspected to be the destruction of evidence.122 In this case, the Court held that 
“exigent circumstances—the need to prevent destruction of evidence—justified the 
warrantless entry,” despite the fact the police “created” the exigent circumstance by 
knocking on the door, because the knock itself did not constitute a violation of the 
 ________________________  
 114. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948). 
 115. Martin v. United States, 183 F.2d 436, 440 (4th Cir. 1950). 
 116. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 615 (1989) (ruling that the railroad has a 
duty to promote public safety and cannot do anything inconsistent with that duty). 
 117. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). 
 118. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
 119. Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011). 
 120. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 298–99. 
 121. Id. at 310. 
 122. King, 563 U.S. at 452. 
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Fourth Amendment.123 Although cases such as this one have broadened the exigent 
circumstances exception, it should be noted that exigent circumstances generally 
are narrowly defined.124 The Court refuses to apply this exception when the timing 
of a search is not urgent or the “gravity of the underlying offense” is minor.125 
Thus, in Welsh v. Wisconsin, the Court held that suspicion of drunk driving did not 
constitute an exigent circumstance justifying warrantless police entry into the 
suspect’s home to arrest him.126 
B. Special Needs and Administrative Searches 
In seeking criteria to ferret out the liberal communitarian balance, the Court 
carved out a very large category of exceptions to the need for individualized 
suspicion and Court approval, namely administrative searches that are justified by 
“special needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement.”127 Most deal with 
searches that do not involve criminal investigations—for instance, routine 
inspections by personnel from OSHA.128 This category also includes warrantless 
searches by administrative authorities in public schools, government offices, and 
prisons; drug testing of public transportation and other government employees; and 
inspection of automobile junkyards and dismantling operations.129  
In all of these cases “the warrant and probable cause requirements are 
dispensed with in favor of a reasonableness standard that balances the 
government’s regulatory interest against the individual’s privacy interest; in all of 
these instances the government’s interest has been found to outweigh the 
individual’s.”130 
A key precedent for the “special needs” exception is Skinner v. Railway 
Laboratory Executives Association, where the Court allowed suspicionless, 
warrantless drug and alcohol testing of train engineers in the wake of a series of 
train accidents.131 In that case, the Court held that while such tests do constitute 
 ________________________  
 123. Id. 
 124. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971). “[S]earches conducted outside 
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Id. at 481. “The 
exceptions are ‘jealously and carefully drawn,’ and there must be ‘a showing by those who seek exemption . . . 
that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative. . . . [T]he burden is on those seeking the 
exemption to show the need for it.’” Id. at 455 (footnote omitted). 
 125. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984). 
 126. Id. at 754. 
 127. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987). 
 128. See, e.g., Warrantless Searches and Seizures, supra note 113, at 116–23. 
 129. See, e.g., Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873–74 (“[A] school, government office or prison, or its supervision of a 
regulated industry . . . presents “special needs” beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from 
the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.”); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 
(1989) (ruling random drug and alcohol testing of train engineers in the wake of a series of train accidents is 
constitutional); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989) (ruling that warrantless drug 
testing of Customs agents is constitutional); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 712 (1987) (ruling that a 
warrantless inspection of vehicle dismantling business is constitutional). 
 130. Annotation 1 - Fourth Amendment, FINDLAW, 
http://constitution.findlaw.com/amendment4/annotation01.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2015). 
 131. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634. 
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searches under the Fourth Amendment, they are “reasonable” searches because the 
government’s “compelling” interest in ensuring “the safety of the traveling public” 
outweighs the employees’ privacy concerns.132  
Similar considerations affected the Court’s ruling in Michigan Department of 
State Police v. Sitz, which upheld warrantless sobriety tests at random highway 
checkpoints.133 In that case, while acknowledging that checkpoint stops constitute a 
“seizure” under the Fourth Amendment, the Court denied the respondents’ 
argument that such stops failed to serve a “special need.”134 Instead, the Court 
pointed to the “magnitude of the drunken driving problem [and] the States’ interest 
in eradicating it,” as well as the Court’s approval of similar checkpoints to search 
for illegal immigrants in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte.135 Applying a balancing 
test, the Court found the privacy intrusion of sobriety checkpoint stops to be small 
and the effectiveness of the program to be adequate.136  
For those who are not tutored in the law (the author included), this special 
needs category could be divided into several subcategories that seem reasonable. In 
one, the acts of those subject to search without judicial review are those who can 
directly and significantly endanger the lives of others, e.g., train engineers. 
“Directly and significantly” is added to limit this subcategory because a very large 
number of people have some effect on the probability that someone will be hurt.137 
Another subcategory is where enforcement is regulatory and cannot result in 
criminal charges—for instance, ensuring that restaurant workers maintain safe 
food-handling practices and personal hygiene.138 A third subcategory is when it is 
not practical to seek a warrant because a very large number of people need to be 
searched in short order.139 One example of this is when the police set up sobriety 
checkpoints on New Year’s Eve. Another is the screening gates first introduced 
into United States airports in 1972, which stopped skyjacking effectively but were 
challenged by the ACLU.140 In all of these kinds of cases, the Court privileged the 
common good over privacy.141 
 ________________________  
 132. Id. at 621, 633. 
 133. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990). 
 134. Id. at 450. 
 135. Id. at 451; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976). 
 136. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455. 
 137. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 n.6 (1989). 
 138. See Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 565 P.2d 138, 144 (Alaska 1977) (noting that many 
courts have adopted warrantless inspections of food establishments as a constitutional administrative search). 
 139. See infra note 140.  
 140. See, e.g., Civil Liberties Implications of Airport Security Measures: Hearing Before White H. Comm. in 
Aviation Safety and Security, (1996) (statement of Gregory T. Nojeim, Legis. Counsel, ACLU), available at 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/faa/aclu_testimony.html; see also Airport Security: Increased Safety Need Not Come 
at the Expense of Civil Liberties, ACLU (Dec. 2, 2001), https://www.aclu.org/national-security/airport-
securityincreased-safety-need-not-come-expense-civil-liberties. 
 141. See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622 n.6 (1989); Woods & Rohde, Inc., 565 P.2d at 144. 
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C. Consent 
A third criterion used by the Court to balance public safety and individual 
rights is the presence of consent.142 Simply put, individuals are free to waive their 
Fourth Amendment protection against warrantless searches and seizures by 
consenting to the search or seizure in question.143 At first blush, one may think that 
this criterion does not affect the balance because consent is willingly granted.144 
However, many people are not aware of their right to refuse to consent.145 In 
contrast to the Fifth Amendment’s Miranda warning requirement, the Court has 
held that police do not need to inform an individual of his or her right to refuse 
consent to a search or seizure.146 Moreover, authority to consent may be shared 
among multiple individuals (for instance, among roommates) with only the consent 
of one required for police to search.147 In dealing with such questions, the Court’s 
rulings reveal that even in this matter the Court has tended to favor the public 
interest over individual rights.148 Thus, the Court has held that consent to a search 
of joint property may be given by any resident in the other’s absence;149 though, if 
both owners are present, either may refuse consent.150 Even the latter limitation on 
the consent exception is qualified by the fact that police may still enter a shared 
home if they suspect domestic violence has occurred.151  
D. Intrusiveness 
A fourth criterion used by the Court draws on the extent individual rights are 
intruded upon more than on the weight accorded to the specific public interest 
involved, drawing on concerns about the level of intrusiveness engendered by a 
given search or seizure.152 Put another way, the Court is more likely to consider 
upholding a warrant exception for a search or seizure—whatever the common 
good—if the government action is minimally intrusive.153 Thus, in reference to 
seizure of a suspected container of illegal drugs, the Court articulated that “seizures 
of property can vary in intrusiveness,” and “when the nature and extent of the 
 ________________________  
 142. Warrantless Searches and Seizures, supra note 113, at 78. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (holding that a search is valid as long as consent 
is “voluntarily given”). 
 145. Kate Schuyler, Right-to-Refuse Warnings: A Minority’s Crusade for Justice, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 769, 
769 (2007). 
 146. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231 (1973). 
 147. Schuyler, supra note 145, at 88. 
 148. See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971) (noting that the public interest in the welfare of 
children is a factor in determining that a search was not unreasonable). 
 149. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169 (1974). 
 150. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006). 
 151. United States v. Martinez, 406 F.3d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 2005). Somewhat offsetting these tilts towards 
the public safety, the Supreme Court does limit the consent exception by holding that burden of proof is on the 
prosecution to prove that consent was given freely and not under coercion. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 
543, 548 (1968). 
 152. Warrantless Searches and Seizures, supra note 113, at 49–52. 
 153. Id. 
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detention are minimally intrusive of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests, 
the opposing law enforcement interests can support a seizure based on less than 
probable cause.”154 
Two examples illustrate the role of the level of intrusiveness in the Court’s 
Fourth Amendment balancing. On the one hand, in Maryland v. King, the Court 
upheld compulsory DNA sampling of those arrested based on probable cause of 
serious crimes, in large part due to the limited intrusiveness of the search.155 
Having already concluded that the public safety interest in identifying suspects was 
great and that DNA sampling significantly furthered that interest, the Court went 
on to assert that the “intrusion of a cheek swab to obtain a DNA sample is 
minimal” as it involves “virtually no risk, trauma, or pain,”156 and furthermore that 
police DNA databases do “not intrude on . . . privacy in a way that would make 
[such] DNA identification unconstitutional.”157 The Court held this finding that the 
intrusion was “negligible” to be of “central relevance to determining 
reasonableness.”158  
On the other end of this scale, the Court held in Tennessee v. Garner, largely 
on the basis of level of intrusiveness, that use of deadly force against an unarmed, 
fleeing burglary suspect was unconstitutional.159 In this case, the Court 
acknowledged that “burglary is a serious crime” and that police had probable cause 
to arrest the suspect.160 However, given that the “intrusiveness of a seizure by 
means of deadly force is unmatched,” it ruled the seizure to be unconstitutional.161 
Note, however, that the Court did not rule out the use of deadly force entirely, but 
instead limited it to situations where “the officer has probable cause to believe that 
the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury,” thus 
avoiding excessive harm to public safety interests.162 
E. Expectation of Privacy 
A fifth criterion used by the Court is the expectation of privacy, which to a 
significant extent tilts in favor of the individual rights side of the communitarian 
equation.163 The Court’s analysis of privacy expectations originates in its ruling in 
Katz v. United States,164 which held that although “what a person knowingly 
exposes to the public” is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, “what he seeks 
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public” may be protected as 
long as the person exhibits a subjective expectation of privacy that society 
 ________________________  
 154. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706, 703 (1983). 
 155. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013). 
 156. Id. at 1964. 
 157. Id. at 1979. 
 158. Id. at 1969. 
 159. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 21 (1985). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 9 (rejecting the argument that killing the suspect would make other suspects more likely to 
surrender). 
 162. Id. at 3. 
 163. Warrantless Searches and Seizures, supra note 113, at 58. 
 164. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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recognizes as “reasonable.”165 Since then, the Katz test has been criticized for being 
circular and subjective, and for leading to mixed results in Fourth Amendment 
cases.166 For the purposes of this discussion, it suffices to point out that the Court’s 
evaluation of specific privacy expectations has favored the public interest in 
several key cases. 
One notable example is found in California v. Greenwood,167 where the Court 
held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect against warrantless search and 
seizure of garbage left outside the home, which had been conducted by the police 
to support a search warrant for a drug raid on a nearby house.168 In this ruling, the 
Court asserted that an expectation of privacy in items discarded “in an area 
particularly suited for public inspection” is “not objectively reasonable.”169  
Also, the Court held in Smith v. Maryland that the tracking of phone numbers 
dialed by a suspect at the request of police did not constitute a “search” under the 
Fourth Amendment.170 In this ruling, the Court held that the suspect “in all 
probability entertained no actual expectation of privacy” in his calling records, and 
such an expectation would not have been “legitimate,” given that telephone users 
“typically know . . . that the company has facilities for recording this information 
and does in fact record it for various legitimate business purposes.”171 This case set 
an important precedent for the third-party doctrine, which holds that information 
shared with third parties is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.172 As advances 
in information technology have led third parties to play an increasingly important 
role in storing and transmitting otherwise confidential information, this doctrine 
increasingly privileges the public-interest side of the communitarian equation by 
facilitating law enforcement’s access to personal information.173 
F. Additional Considerations 
The five criteria listed above are not a comprehensive list of factors considered 
by the Court in balancing public safety and individual rights. In its extensive 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has formulated several other specific 
exceptions and qualifications to the Fourth Amendment warrant, probable cause, 
and individualized suspicion requirements—and provided additional rationale for 
so ruling.174 Thus, the Court held that warrantless searches of automobiles are 
permitted given probable cause,175 that searches at international borders require 
 ________________________  
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 172. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009). 
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neither warrants nor probable cause,176 and that evidence in “plain view” during a 
legitimate search may be seized,177 giving different rationales in each case, 
although some partially overlap with those already cited above.  
Some argue that the Court’s rulings over the last few decades have steadily 
undermined individual rights, particularly privacy, by favoring public safety 
considerations in Fourth Amendment cases. Thus, Thomas N. McInnis argues that 
the Court’s changing interpretations of the amendment have eroded the warrant 
requirement over time.178 William Stuntz finds that the Court’s change of emphasis 
in focusing on “unreasonable searches and seizures” rather than the warrant clause 
has narrowed the scope of the warrant requirement.179 Andrew Talai holds that “in 
the last few decades, the Supreme Court has narrowed its vision of Fourth 
Amendment rights to an opaque privacy rationale.”180 Shaun Spencer states that 
changing technology, coupled with the Court’s “reasonable expectations” doctrine 
of privacy, facilitates the incremental erosion of privacy.181 Likewise, Shima 
Baradaran notes that the Court has tended to favor the government when balancing 
individual rights and public safety in recent Fourth Amendment cases because the 
Fourth Amendment case is typically made by a “criminal defendant whose hands 
are dirty.”182 For his part, Christopher Slobogin argues that the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence has failed to keep pace with evolving government 
surveillance techniques.183 
At the same time, no one claims that all the cases have lined up on one side of 
liberal communitarian balancing equation. Any such trend is offset in part by two 
factors: the Court’s restricting warrantless searches in recent cases and its creation 
of new rights. The Court has introduced and clarified new rights, though mainly in 
the 1960s.184 The Court introduced the Miranda right185 and the reasonable 
expectation of privacy standard, which, for all its limits, has upheld individual 
rights against public safety concerns in contexts where a different Fourth 
 ________________________  
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 179. William J. Stuntz, Warrant Clause, in HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 426, 429 (David F. 
Forte et al. eds., 2012), available at http://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/amendments/4/essays/145/warrant-
clause. 
 180. Andrew B. Talai, Drones and Jones: The Fourth Amendment and Police Discretion in the Digital Age, 
102 CALIF. L. REV. 729, 729 (2014). 
 181. See Shaun Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843, 
84460 (2002). 
 182. See Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1, 47 (2013). 
 183. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 34 (2007); see also Andrew J. DeFilippis, Securing Informationships: Recognizing a Right 
to Privity in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 115 YALE L.J. 1086, 1092 (2006) (criticizing the Court’s third-
party doctrine in particular for undermining privacy in a society increasingly characterized by “shared access to 
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Amendment doctrine might not have, as with thermal imaging186 and use of drug-
sniffing dogs187 on the periphery of a house.188  
More recently, in Riley v. California189 the Court limited the warrant exception 
for searches incident to a lawless arrest by affirming that police searches of 
arrestees’ cell phone data require a warrant.190 The Court also limited the 
expectation of privacy doctrine in United States v. Jones,191 holding that 
surreptitious police attachment of a GPS surveillance device to a suspect’s car 
violated his Fourth Amendment property rights, thus constituting a “search” 
regardless of privacy expectations.192 Commentators have argued that Riley and 
Jones, respectively, “brought the Fourth Amendment into the digital age”193 and 
“bode well for continued protection of citizens’ public privacy rights.”194  
In short, whether one finds that the Court has found a sound liberal 
communitarian balance, or that it has tilted too heavily toward either the public 
safety or the individual rights side of the balancing equation, there is no question 
that the Court has accorded considerable weight to the public interest.  
V.  EMINENT DOMAIN: OPENINGS TO CAPTURE 
A third area in which we study the Supreme Court balancing of the common 
good and individual rights is that of eminent domain, or the expropriation of 
private property by the government in the service of one public interest or 
another.195 The legal concept of eminent domain is based on the Fifth Amendment 
takings clause, which reads, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”196 In 1875, the Court asserted that the clause “contains 
an implied recognition” of eminent domain: what is the “provision that private 
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation . . . but an 
implied assertion that, on making just compensation, it may be taken?”197 As a 
result, the Court affirmed the Federal Government’s “power to appropriate lands or 
other property within the states for its own uses,” arguing that such power is 
“essential to its independent existence and perpetuity”198 and “is an attribute of 
 ________________________  
 186. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
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sovereignty.”199 The Court’s subsequent rulings concerned defining what uses of 
confiscated property may qualify as “public use,” and thus are constitutionally 
valid.200  
The Court recognized that eminent domain may be used to secure property for 
government buildings; water, transportation, communications, and energy 
infrastructure; and national defense.201 The Court also upheld the use of eminent 
domain for “public buildings,” including “for forts, armories, and arsenals, for 
navy yards and lighthouses, for custom houses, post offices, and courthouses, and 
for other public uses.”202 Subsequent rulings affirmed that eminent domain could 
be used to secure land for memorial sites,203 aqueducts,204 canals,205 railroads,206 
war production,207 and public parks.208  
State legislatures and state and federal courts also permitted the use of eminent 
domain by private entities, such as canal, railroad, and turnpike companies, to build 
transportation infrastructure to which the public would have access,209 as well as 
for electricity and lighting infrastructure,210 oil pipelines,211 telephone lines,212 and 
cable and fiber optic lines.213  
In Berman v. Parker214 the Court permitted the State not only to seize property 
for literal “public use” (whether under private or public ownership), but also to 
transfer property to a new private owner for his or her own private use, albeit in 
pursuit of some broader “public purpose.”215 Specifically, the Court found that the 
use of eminent domain to facilitate “urban renewal” programs was a justifiable way 
to deal with “urban blight,” or slum conditions.216 The Court deferred to Congress 
and state legislatures to determine what qualifies as a “public purpose” justifying 
eminent domain, upholding “all means necessary and appropriate” to deal with 
conditions “injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare.”217 As such, 
the Court upheld in Berman both the seizure of non-blighted property within a 
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blighted area in pursuit of a comprehensive development plan and the transfer of 
property to another private owner for private, rather than public, use.218       
The Court noted that while the government’s “police power” had been 
traditionally associated with “public safety, public health, morality, peace and 
quiet, law and order,” these examples “merely illustrate the scope of the power, and 
do not delimit it,” as the “concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive . . . . 
The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as 
monetary.”219  
Taking Berman as precedent, another unanimous ruling upheld a Hawaii land 
reform program intended to broaden land ownership, accepting the Hawaii 
Legislature’s position that “concentrated land ownership was responsible for 
skewing the State’s residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring 
the public tranquility and welfare,” and reaffirming that “regulating oligopoly and 
the evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a State’s police powers.”220 In 
making this judgment, the Court broadened the precedent from Berman, asserting 
that while taking “one person’s property . . . for the benefit of another” requires a 
“justifying public purpose . . . . [i]t is not essential that the entire community, nor 
even any considerable portion . . . directly enjoy or participate . . . [for it] to 
constitute a public use.”221  
Continuing this trend, the Court’s five-to-four ruling in Kelo v. City of New 
London held that the government may also use eminent domain to transfer private 
property from one owner to another “for the purpose of economic development.” In 
upholding the taking of property from neighborhood residents for use by a private 
developer, the Court neither mandated a finding of urban blight nor required the 
new owner to perform a public function or grant public access.222 Instead, the Court 
deferred to the City’s “determination that the area at issue was sufficiently 
distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation,” arguing that “because 
that plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings challenged here 
satisfy . . . the Fifth Amendment.”223 Thus, the Court rejected the argument that 
“economic development does not qualify as a public use,” countering that 
“[p]romoting economic development is a traditional and long-accepted function of 
government. There is, moreover, no principled way of distinguishing economic 
development from the other public purposes.”224 Crucially, it rejected calls for 
“‘reasonable certainty’ that the expected public benefits will actually accrue” (such 
as a legal obligation on the developer to meet certain economic goals), noting the 
“departure from [the Court’s] precedent” and “disadvantages of a heightened form 
of review” that such requirements would entail.225   
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The Kelo ruling weakened the safeguards against eminent domain abuse by 
creating a new incentive for private interests to influence regulators while reducing 
the potential for public accountability.226 That is not to argue that eminent domain 
in line with Kelo cannot serve the public interest. Defenders of Kelo point out that 
“residential condemnation for redevelopment” is rare, and in most states is required 
to produce more and better low-income housing.227 By watering down the 
definition of public use, however, the ruling greatly increased the risk that special 
interests will capture the process. Thus, Justice O’Connor, arguing for the minority, 
warned that the  
specter of condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to 
prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, 
any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory . . . . 
The beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with 
disproportionate influence and power in the political process, 
including large corporations and development firms.228 
Even Justice Kennedy, who concurred with the judgment, warned that courts 
must still strike down any taking “that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a 
particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits.”229 He 
argued that courts should “treat the objection as a serious one and review the record 
to see if it has merit” when “confronted with a plausible accusation of 
impermissible favoritism to private parties.”230 Finally, he suggested that there 
“may be private transfers in which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism 
of private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of 
invalidity is warranted under the Public Use Clause.”231 
It is important to note that the “blight” standard for eminent domain in place 
prior to Kelo already created opportunities for abuse due to the broad definition of 
blight—which critics argue includes “vague and subjective criteria” that could 
apply to virtually any property232—and the permissive process for its 
determination—which critics allege facilitates rent-seeking and regulatory capture 
behavior by developers, and suffers from excessive deference by the judiciary.233 
Most notoriously, the mid-twentieth century urban renewal projects facilitated by 
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Berman, while having some positive economic impact,234 are generally seen even 
by today’s proponents of eminent domain235 to have been racially discriminatory in 
their motivations and impact, as they tended to displace African American and 
Puerto Rican communities,236 thereby reinforcing racial segregation237 and leading 
critics to dub such programs “Negro Removal.”238 
Martin Gold and Lynne Sagalin find that a “large and strong coalition of 
mutual interests supports redevelopment,” including “city officials, redevelopment 
agencies, urban planners, real estate consultants and attorneys, developers, and 
environmental interest groups,” making abuse of eminent domain more likely.239 
Whereas the government may be held accountable by taxpayers for condemning 
property and then failing to use that property productively, private interests are less 
accountable.240 Thus, Nancy Kubasek and Garrett Coyle warn that 
[b]ecause corporations do not face consequences if their estimates 
to the legislature differ from reality, a moral hazard problem is 
present: corporations have an incentive to overstate the number of 
jobs and the amount of tax revenue they will create given a 
suitable site. Moreover . . . the judiciary cannot review the 
likelihood that the public benefit targeted by the taking will be 
achieved. The logical corollary of this moral hazard problem is that 
legislatures may press for eminent domain condemnations to 
which they would never have consented had they known the actual 
or even likely outcomes.241  
Likewise, Ilya Somin takes issue with the Court’s deference to the legislature 
on this issue:  
“[A]mong all the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, only the public 
use limitation is singled out for heavy [judicial] deference” . . . . 
There is little sense in recognizing a constitutional right for the 
purpose of curbing abuses of government power, and then leaving 
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the definition of that right up to the discretion of the very officials 
whose power the right is supposed to restrict.242 
The issues noted by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy have had negative 
impacts in practice.243 In the case of the Fort Trumbull neighborhood of New 
London, the subject of the Kelo ruling, the expropriation and demolition of the 
residential and commercial property in question was never followed by the 
promised economic development.244 Pfizer, the pharmaceutical company on behalf 
of which eminent domain was exercised, not only failed to develop the area but 
ended its operations there.245 Instead of the expected hotel, conference center, 
condominium complex, health club, and shopping area, Fort Trumbull is now a 
“vast, empty field . . . entirely uninhabited.”246 This was not an isolated incident: 
the “most famous economic development taking”247 prior to Kelo, Poletown 
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,248 condemned a residential area in order 
to build a General Motors factory that likewise became an expensive failure.249  
Following Kelo, the government has used economic growth to justify the use of 
eminent domain to acquire property even for development projects of questionable 
social utility, such as casinos in New Jersey.250 In New York City, both the 
Columbia University Harlem expansion and the Atlantic Yards project were 
accused by opponents of “questionable determination[s] of blight,” collusion 
between developers and regulators, and ignoring community input.251 Furthermore, 
a 2012 study on “judicial biographies and takings decisions since 1975” concluded 
that “decisions favoring physical takings increase [economic] growth by 0.2% 
points but reduce minority home ownership and employment by 0.5% and 0.3% 
points respectively.”252 
Kelo drew adverse public and legislative reaction, including a 365 to 33 vote in 
the House of Representatives to condemn the ruling, denunciations from public 
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figures and organizations across the political spectrum, and critical public opinion 
polls.253 Embracing Kelo’s caveat that “nothing in our opinion precludes any State 
from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power,” and 
responding to the “intensity and broad-based, nonpartisan character of the 
backlash,”254 a large number of state legislatures passed some form of eminent 
domain reform.255 The Institute for Justice, which campaigned for eminent domain 
and blight standards reform following Kelo, asserts that twenty-three states have 
passed “substantive eminent domain reform” and twenty-one states have added 
“increased eminent domain protections” since 2005, leaving only six without 
significant reform.256 The intensity and effectiveness of these reforms varied: a few 
eliminated blight as a condition for eminent domain; others narrowed the definition 
of blight to more closely fit its original meaning as conditions “detrimental to or an 
actual danger to public health and safety;” and still others narrowed the scope of 
blight determination to focus on individual units more than whole areas.257  
Political science has developed a considerable body of scholarship on what is 
called “capture theory.”258 It refers to conditions in which private interests gain 
control of a public asset or process and employ it to do their bidding, thus voiding 
its contribution to the common good.259 Capture comes in several forms including 
regulatory capture, when those that are to be regulated use the regulations to 
advance their special interests, and legislative capture, in which private interests 
pervert the democratic process, often by passing laws that seem to serve the public 
interest but actually rain down benefits upon limited private groups.260 Capture is 
often achieved through campaign contributions, sometimes referred to as legalized 
bribery, and sometimes through illegal means.261 The preceding discussion of 
eminent domain suggests that the judicial process can also be captured. This is 
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especially likely to occur when judges are elected rather than appointed and must 
raise campaign funds in order to increase their chances of becoming elected, a 
recent trend.262  
All of this shows that a sound liberal communitarian policy needs not only a 
carefully crafted balance between the public interest and individual rights that is 
recalibrated as conditions change significantly, but also requires ensuring that the 
purposes served are indeed public goods. This analysis brings us full circle. We 
started by showing that one can distinguish the public good from those sought by 
private parties, and we now see that without a clear line, there is a danger that the 
concept of public good will be abused by special interests, many of which serve 
neither the common good nor individual rights but merely their particular 
members.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
We have seen the common good (or the public interest) can be defined, and 
that liberal communitarian philosophy suggests that a good society will draw a 
carefully crafted balance between the common good and individual rights. 
Moreover, this balance will be recalibrated as historical conditions change. We 
found the Supreme Court of the United States is much more willing to curb free 
speech for common goods that seem to command not nearly the same normative 
standing as those the Court has shortchanged when it comes to the First 
Amendment. Free speech protection would be undermined very little if the Court 
set limits on hate speech similar to those society in effect has set, such as providing 
more protection for the those burying their fallen heroes by keeping radical zealots 
further away, and by shielding women seeking abortions from aggressive, in-your-
face verbal abuse, thus enforcing society’s norms and incentives.  
We saw that, in dealing with public safety as a common good, the Court came 
particularly close to the liberal communitarian position, when it drew on the text of 
the Fourth Amendment that bars only unreasonable searches and seizures. The 
Court made numerous specific rulings in this area, and provided different rationales 
for the various rulings, tilting sometimes to public safety and sometimes to 
individual rights. One may argue whether, given the current conditions, it tilted too 
far toward promoting public safety or toward protecting individual rights.  
Likewise, one can agree that, in general, the Court followed a liberal 
communitarian approach in dealing with takings, in particular with eminent 
domain. The Court in effect created a whole area in which it allows individual 
rights, in particular private property rights, to be set aside in the service of one 
common good or another. However, in the process, the Court opened the door to 
fake public goods, which allow special interests groups to use the terminology and 
legal basis of eminent domain to serve not the public interests, but their private 
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ones. Liberal communitarians need to draw on reforms instituted by many states to 
shore up the line that separates genuine from faux public goods. 
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